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NASA PRESS BRIEFING

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**MICHAEL COATS**, Director, Johnson Space Center  
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**LON MILLER**, CEO, Jacobs Engineering

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Houston, Texas

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## 1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 MODERATOR: We will have brief opening  
3 statements, and then we will go to questions. We will need  
4 to limit those just a bit in the interest of time.

5 So, Mike, would you like to start?

6 ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: Thank you, Eileen.

7 We are here today for a very unfortunate and  
8 unpleasant reason. Yesterday, we lost a valued member of  
9 the NASA team, a long-time, very highly regarded engineer,  
10 David Beverly, a man who was married to his junior high  
11 school sweetheart and whose mission in life was to make  
12 NASA the best agency that he could.

13 He got up to go to work yesterday morning, never  
14 imagining that it was going to be his last day to do so,  
15 and we are here to talk to you about it, answer the  
16 questions that we can, but I would like you to keep in mind  
17 what I just said about who we lost.

18 Thank you.

19 MR. COATS: Okay. Let me make a few points here  
20 before we turn it over to the Chief.

21 Yesterday events remind us that tragedy can touch  
22 us at any moment, and we really can never truly guarantee

1 and protect ourselves.

2 I am extremely proud of how David Beverly and  
3 Fran Crenshaw reacted yesterday. Even after being wounded,  
4 David attempted to barricade the office in an attempt to  
5 protect himself and Fran from further injury, and he died  
6 in that attempt.

7 Fran's behavior was nothing short of heroic  
8 during the hours that she was a hostage. She was amazingly  
9 composed and calm and has been able to provide the Houston  
10 Police Department with good information on how the events  
11 exactly unfolded yesterday.

12 Today, the NASA team is pulling together to  
13 comfort those in need and begin the process of healing. We  
14 have met with Fran. Mike and I went out and met with both  
15 Fran Crenshaw and previous to that with Linda Beverly this  
16 morning, and our NASA team and our NASA family is providing  
17 them with as much support as they need. David and Fran and  
18 their families deserve our respect and admiration for the  
19 courage that they have demonstrated.

20 I want to say I got some questions last night. I  
21 do want to say that while our jobs are often demanding,  
22 they are jobs that we have chosen because we believe in

1 what we do, and we believe it is important to the country.

2           Speaking for Mike and myself, we take the welfare  
3 and safety of our employees very seriously, and as part of  
4 the family here at NASA, we do try to watch out for each  
5 other. We are committed to ensuring as safe a work  
6 environment as possible out here. We will be looking at  
7 yesterday's events to see if we can improve the security  
8 for our employees out here, but I do want to commend our  
9 Johnson Space Center security forces as well as the Houston  
10 Police Department, the Constable's Office, the FBI, and  
11 several other organizations that just worked so smoothly  
12 together. They were very well coordinated, and I was very  
13 impressed with the professionalism of everybody involved.

14           Thank you.

15           MODERATOR: Chief Hurtt?

16           CHIEF HURTT: Thank you.

17           Yesterday, a troubled Jacobs Engineering contract  
18 employee for NASA took the life of a NASA civil servant,  
19 held another colleague hostage, before taking his own life.

20           Today, we are going to be informing the community how this  
21 incident unfolded.

22           In the days to come, we hope that the facts

1 gathered as a part of our investigation will lead all of us  
2 toward a better understanding as to why these types of  
3 incidents occur and how future tragedies can be prevented.

4           As we outlined yesterday's tragic events, two  
5 things will become very, I think, immediate apparent to  
6 you. First, this unprecedented act of violence at the  
7 Johnson Space Center was quickly and efficiently contained  
8 and controlled by NASA's security forces and law  
9 enforcement personnel. Coordination, cooperation, and team  
10 work kept the incident contained without greater loss of  
11 life to other employees or to law enforcement officials.

12           Second and more importantly, we saw two ordinary  
13 people confronted with a nightmare-type situation and  
14 responded in a heroic manner. Mr. David Beverly and Ms.  
15 Fran Crenshaw are the names to be remembered and celebrated  
16 as testaments to grace under fire.

17           At present, we have determined that Mr. Beverly  
18 was a career NASA civil servant in charge of quality  
19 assurance issues. He had reported job performance  
20 deficiencies associated with the suspect in this incident.

21           On March 16, 2007, an e-mail was created and sent  
22 to the suspect describing his performance deficiencies and

1 set out a plan of improvement. The suspect printed out the  
2 e-mail on March 18th, the same day the suspect purchased a  
3 five-shot Smith & Wesson revolver and 20 rounds of  
4 hollow-point ammunition.

5 The subject blamed Mr. Beverly for being  
6 responsible for his negative job performance situation. So  
7 yesterday at approximately 1:30 p.m., the suspect entered  
8 the office suite housing Mr. Beverly and Ms. Crenshaw with  
9 a gun purchased in March. He was holding it in his left  
10 hand.

11 Ms. Crenshaw reported that Mr. Beverly spoke in a  
12 calm, soothing manner offering a number of options for job  
13 improvements including a transfer with the individual as  
14 they talked about the situation. The two talked for  
15 several minutes before the suspect raised his weapon and  
16 shot Mr. Beverly two times, once in the right leg and again  
17 in the chest.

18 The suspect exited the office suite for a few  
19 seconds, allowing Mr. Beverly to move to protect himself  
20 and Ms. Crenshaw. Despite being critically wounded, Mr.  
21 Beverly attempted to block the suspect from reentering the  
22 office by pushing his desk against the door.

1 Unfortunately, the suspect was able to take advantage of  
2 Mr. Beverly's weakened state and forced his way back into  
3 the office, again firing at Mr. Beverly, shooting him more  
4 times. Mr. Beverly fell mortally wounded.

5 The suspect then barred the door to the office  
6 suite, taking Ms. Crenshaw as a hostage. Ms. Crenshaw was  
7 taken to the far corner office bound by wrists and arms  
8 with duct tape. Ms. Crenshaw remained a captive until the  
9 suspect took his own life.

10 During her captivity, Ms. Crenshaw was able to  
11 talk with the suspect. She maintained her composure  
12 throughout the entire ordeal.

13 The message I hope comes from this horrific  
14 incident is one of courage. NASA has a long condition of  
15 courage, ingenuity, and strength. The strength by two NASA  
16 employees was demonstrated yesterday.

17 The team work philosophy at work every day in the  
18 Space Program was also evident. HPD, combined with the  
19 Johnson Space Center Security, the FBI, Precinct 8 Deputy  
20 Constable Sandlin, and ATF agents all contributed to the  
21 containment and the resolution of this incident.

22 We have learned one thing at this point. It is

1 that heroes just don't fly in space. Sometimes heroes work  
2 in the next cubicle to you.

3 Now I will ask Lieutenant Baimbridge to provide a  
4 detailed timeline of the events as they occurred yesterday.

5 LIEUTENANT BAIMBRIDGE: I am going to run through  
6 the timeline, as Chief said, and going back to March the  
7 16th, a little over a month ago, the suspect received an  
8 e-mail from his supervisor at Jacobs Engineering regarding  
9 his work performance. A copy of this e-mail, hard copy of  
10 this e-mail was found yesterday in his lunch bag, which was  
11 left on his desk.

12 On March the 18th, 2007, the suspect purchased  
13 the Smith & Wesson .38 special revolver, and then  
14 yesterday, April the 20th, the suspect had lunch with Dave  
15 Beverly as well as another male. The other male stated  
16 that there was no -- nothing seemed out of the ordinary,  
17 except perhaps for the suspect's slight unusual demeanor,  
18 aside from his normal demeanor, which has also been  
19 described as quite odd.

20 Approximately 1:33 p.m., yesterday, the suspect  
21 entered the office of Mr. Beverly. Ms. Crenshaw had been  
22 in Mr. Beverly's office talking with him. The suspect held

1 a gun in his hand and stated, "You are the one that is  
2 going to get me fired."

3 Mr. Beverly spoke with the suspect in a very calm  
4 manner and attempted to try to calm him down, all the while  
5 the suspect held the gun in his hand.

6 After several minutes of talking with Mr.  
7 Beverly, the suspect shot him twice. He then left the  
8 office and returned a short time later and shot him two  
9 more times.

10 At 1:37 p.m., JSC dispatch received a "man with a  
11 gun" call at Building No. 44. They also had a secure alarm  
12 sounded, which meant that a secured door had been opened.

13 At approximately 1:43 p.m., all JSC security  
14 arrived on the scene, and they secured the building and  
15 helped to evacuate those inside.

16 Upon arrival at the scene, they found that two  
17 other individuals had barricaded themselves in their  
18 offices, which they escorted out to safety.

19 Several people that exited the building stated  
20 that they had seen a man with a revolver upstairs. HPD and  
21 HP SWAT were called out to the scene. Between the hours of  
22 2:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., Special Agent Richard Hewitt with

1 JSC made several attempts to contact the suspect via the  
2 telephone in Ms. Crenshaw's office. The suspect answered  
3 the phone, but never made any statements to him.

4 During this time, the suspect called from that  
5 same phone to Mr. Hewitt, seeing the Caller-ID and where he  
6 was calling from, but never made any statement to him.

7 At approximately 4:28 p.m., a gunshot was heard  
8 by SWAT members who were inside Building No. 44. At 4:30  
9 p.m., the decision was made to breach the door into the  
10 office where the hostage was being held. Once inside, they  
11 found that the complainant, Mr. Beverly, was deceased, and  
12 they also found that the suspect had been shot in the head  
13 by himself. The hostage, Ms. Crenshaw, who was taped up,  
14 was quickly removed and taken to a safe place where she  
15 received medical treatment.

16 I also want to note that according to Ms.  
17 Crenshaw during this incident, the suspect was watching  
18 everything unfold on television.

19 And I state this because he was watching as for  
20 the deployment of SWAT and other equipment, which I think  
21 it is important to note why we are careful about trying to  
22 keep the media back at times, as he was able to get some

1 intel from this. I know the decision was made at some  
2 point during this to cut the feed, to prevent any other  
3 information getting out that shouldn't be.

4           Finally, the suspect told Ms. Crenshaw that he  
5 was taping her mouth shut in an effort to prevent her from  
6 screaming once he shot himself. His statement to her was  
7 basically that he did not want her to scream and then the  
8 police to rush in and save his life. His fear was that he  
9 would end up in jail, and he didn't want to go there. It  
10 was obvious from his intent initially that he went there  
11 with the intent to kill himself as well as Mr. Beverly.

12           Thank you.

13           MODERATOR: Thank you.

14           MR. MILLER: We are profoundly saddened by this  
15 event. We mourn the loss of Mr. Beverly and the trauma  
16 suffered by Ms. Crenshaw and now the trauma suffered by  
17 their families.

18           Since the incident yesterday, we have been  
19 working with NASA. The first thing we did was locate all  
20 of our employees that had evacuated Building 44, and since  
21 then, we have been counseling our employees, talking to  
22 them, and setting up our Employee Assistance Program folks

1 to come and talk to them.

2 We will continue to do that until this crisis is  
3 over and we return to what might be considered normal  
4 operations.

5 MODERATOR: Thank you all.

6 We are going to go to questions. I will ask that  
7 you right now -- just one question per person for right  
8 now. We are limited. We will need to be finishing this  
9 up. If you have questions specifically for Mike Griffin, I  
10 would suggest you ask those first.

11 REPORTER: Rasha Madkour with AP.

12 Can you talk a little bit about what you will be  
13 reviewing with the security measures and what you think  
14 this event will bring around?

15 MODERATOR: Who is this question for?

16 REPORTER: Mr. Griffin.

17 ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: Well, as Chief Hurtt  
18 pointed out this morning, in any sort of incident like this  
19 or of many other kinds, even though the initial impression  
20 was that everybody who participated handled themselves just  
21 about as well as could be done, there are always lessons to  
22 be learned, and those lessons may save another life later

1 on, and if there is such a lesson out there, we want to  
2 find it.

3 So we will be conducting a top-down review of the  
4 whole incident, and we will tell you how it comes out.

5 REPORTER: As a follow-up, Mr. Griffin -- Susan  
6 Roesgen with CNN -- are you considering having metal  
7 detectors inside the buildings themselves here at Johnson  
8 Space Center?

9 ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: Well, I am not saying  
10 that anything is off the table or on the table. We will  
11 consider all of that.

12 But I would again point out what has been said by  
13 others, that when an employee badged onto a center or into  
14 a building of any kind who is allowed to come into that  
15 building has decided that he wishes to avenge a grudge or  
16 not and is willing to die in the process, that it is  
17 essentially impossible to stop such a person.

18 We see that in the Mideast on a nearly daily  
19 basis, unfortunately. We saw it on September 11th of 2001.

20 I regret to say that I suspect we will see more of it.  
21 That was what we had yesterday.

22 This individual came in, as you have heard from

1 Lieutenant Baimbridge's statements, determined that at the  
2 end of it, he was going to die, and before he did, he  
3 wanted to satisfy a grudge.

4 MODERATOR: Gina?

5 REPORTER: Gina Sunceri, ABC News, for Michael  
6 Coast.

7 Michael, what message are you sending to the  
8 other employees here? What are you telling them about  
9 this, and what do you want them to know?

10 MR. COATS: Well, what we are trying to get out  
11 -- first of all, I learned, because I lived in Littleton  
12 when they had the Columbine massacre, that it is very  
13 important for people to have the opportunity to talk about  
14 their concerns and their fears. If they have concerns  
15 about security in the workplace, it is important to talk  
16 about that and answer their questions and try to reassure  
17 them. It is really a matter of informing them.

18 We will inform them of all the details that we  
19 have on this incident. We will inform them about  
20 everything we are doing in the way of reviewing our  
21 security, again, which we just did after the Virginia Tech  
22 shootings, but it is important to, first of all, inform the

1 employees and then give them an opportunity to voice their  
2 fears and concerns, if you will.

3 MODERATOR: Mark Carreau.

4 REPORTER: Mark Carreau with the Houston  
5 Chronicle.

6 Do you have a set procedure, either NASA or  
7 contractor, for counseling an employee in matters of job  
8 performance, as you have described this, and if so, was  
9 that procedure followed? And if not, is that a lapse that  
10 you will be looking into in this regard?

11 MR. COATS: Well, let me refer that to Lon.

12 MR. MILLER: The answer, was our procedure  
13 followed, is yes. This had not reached the point of formal  
14 disciplinary action. We were aware of some poor  
15 performance on this employee's part, mainly involving  
16 schedule performance. His technical work was regarded  
17 fairly highly, but we did get some feedback that he wasn't  
18 showing up at meetings on time, and work was having to be  
19 picked up by others.

20 So our immediate supervisors counseled him, gave  
21 him an eight-step plan. They wanted to see some  
22 improvement in these specific areas of performance, and

1 that was several weeks ago. He complied with one of those  
2 actions and did submit documentation to confirm that, but  
3 did not provide any feedback on the other seven.

4 In our process then, at that point, we would then  
5 consider more formal disciplinary action that could lead up  
6 to termination, but with this employee, we had not gotten  
7 that far, and there was no discussion as to what  
8 disciplinary action, if any, would be taken. It was still  
9 at the supervisory level.

10 MODERATOR: We will come back once again.

11 REPORTER: Mr. Griffin, this is Susan Roesgen  
12 again with CNN. I just feel compelled to ask you a little  
13 bit more about this. If this guy with the gun had been in  
14 your Mission Control Center and had been in the Operations  
15 Room -- you know, you tried to bring back a crew from the  
16 Space Station yesterday -- it wouldn't have just been a  
17 grudge that would have been solved. Some more innocent  
18 lives and a very serious project in this Federal facility  
19 could have been affected. I am really curious as to why  
20 metal detectors aren't in the buildings or searching for  
21 weapons inside cars are not done routinely.

22 ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: Well, we will be

1 reviewing all of that, but citizens do have rights against  
2 unreasonable search and seizure. We have to respect those  
3 rights. We can't detain or stop people merely because they  
4 happen to be, in the opinions of some others, acting oddly.

5 We will be considering all of the issues involved and what  
6 steps we may take and what steps we may not take.

7 MR. COATS: I would like to point out, since you  
8 raised that example, we do have metal detectors in our  
9 control centers here, but as far as searching cars, we  
10 would literally have to dismantle every car as they came in  
11 every day, and with 10,000 employees, that is probably not  
12 realistic.

13 REPORTER: Michelle Kofus [ph] with the local  
14 Fox.

15 I believe this will be for Mr. Miller. To your  
16 knowledge, has anyone who worked with Phillips ever  
17 expressed concern about his demeanor, how he treated  
18 people?

19 MR. MILLER: No, nothing in particular. He was  
20 regarded as a quiet employee, somewhat reclusive.

21 There were discussions, technical discussions at  
22 times over differences of opinion, but there was nothing

1 outstanding in his demeanor or actions in the recent past  
2 that would indicate he was considering anything of this  
3 nature.

4 REPORTER: Rasha with AP again.

5 Could you explain what the relationship was with  
6 Mr. Beverly and the suspect, why he might have blamed Mr.  
7 Beverly for his job performance?

8 Thank you.

9 MR. COATS: Again, Mr. Beverly -- David was a  
10 NASA employee. He had responsibility for what we called  
11 "Triple E Parts" and was considered an expert professional  
12 in that field. In fact, he was supposed to be on his way  
13 to a conference this week to give a presentation.

14 Mr. Phillips was a quality assurance inspector.  
15 So that was their relationship. They were not supervisor  
16 relationship, but they certainly worked with each other on  
17 a regular basis.

18 REPORTER: Yes. For Chief Hurtt, Melissa Jacobs,  
19 Fox News Channel.

20 Any more updates on the note that was scribbled  
21 on the board?

22 CHIEF HURTT: I will defer to Chief King or

1 Lieutenant Baimbridge on that.

2           LIEUTENANT BAIMBRIDGE: There were several notes  
3 that were left, handwritten notes. During the whole  
4 hostage situation, Ms. Crenshaw stated he was writing these  
5 during the hours that he kept her hostage.

6           Basically, he made some statements that, "He kept  
7 calling me stupid," quote, referring to Mr. Beverly.  
8 However, talking to Ms. Crenshaw, there was never any time  
9 that she heard him call him "stupid." We haven't found  
10 anyone that ever heard Mr. Beverly call him stupid.

11           He also left some other information, contact  
12 information for next of kin, that sort of thing, but  
13 basically, it was a rambling about people calling him  
14 "stupid."

15           REPORTER: Mark Carreau for the Houston  
16 Chronicle.

17           I have a related set of questions. Sometimes in  
18 personnel actions when you are counseling an employee and  
19 you think they may be troubled, especially when they have  
20 to make a security pass, the security personnel have a  
21 photograph, and that triggers a search, a random search  
22 maybe, but this time you search this guy.

1           Do you guys know how he carried this guy in yet,  
2 and did security forces have any reason to have photos or  
3 anything that would sort of tip them to want to look at  
4 this gentleman when he came to work during this counseling  
5 process, and is that a lapse that you would look at in  
6 further action?

7           MR. COATS: Well, we will certainly look at  
8 everything we possibly can here in our review that we are  
9 going to conduct.

10           My understanding is that he did carry a  
11 duffle-type bag in with him that had the gun, and other  
12 than that, we don't have any more information for you,  
13 Mark.

14           REPORTER: Page Hewitt with the Chronicle. This  
15 is for the Lieutenant.

16           Did you find any evidence that Phillips was  
17 suffering from severe mental illness of any kind?

18           LIEUTENANT BAIMBRIDGE: Well, aside from the  
19 obvious situation.

20           REPORTER: Did he ever take any medication, any  
21 --

22           LIEUTENANT BAIMBRIDGE: No. No. There was no

1 medication or anything like that, aside from, you know, the  
2 writings, that sort of thing. To say he is not in a normal  
3 state of mind is obviously an understatement, but no, there  
4 was no medication or anything like that.

5           REPORTER: One more quick question, if you don't  
6 mind. Can you address the possibility of counterfeit  
7 software? I don't know who that might go to. Was that an  
8 issue? Can you confirm that there was anything like that  
9 going on?

10           ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: There is an IG  
11 investigation at NASA underway regarding counterfeit parts  
12 -- not software -- parts from a particular distributor of  
13 parts, labeling the parts as being made by one manufacturer  
14 when they were not, in fact, made by that manufacturer. I  
15 don't think that has any bearing on this case.

16           Now, again, Dave Beverly was a parts specialist,  
17 and we try very hard to make sure that we truly do have  
18 space-grade parts in flight hardware, but we have not  
19 understood any connection between that investigation and  
20 this incident.

21           REPORTER: Susan Roesgen again with CNN. Since I  
22 might not get another shot, I have got two quick ones in

1 here for you.

2 First of all, can you tell us the nature of the  
3 poor performance review, and secondly, is there  
4 psychological screening that goes on not only for NASA  
5 employees, but also for contract employees? Are you doing  
6 psychological testing? Certainly, the Nowak case comes up  
7 in relation to this as well, so two questions.

8 MR. MILLER: I will take the first one on the  
9 nature of the deficiencies. We receive midterm evaluations  
10 from our customers on all of our tasks.

11 On this particular task, Mr. Beverly reported  
12 that he was unhappy with some of our schedule performance,  
13 our participation in meetings, and many of the things that  
14 we identified in our eight-step improvement plan for Mr.  
15 Phillips. We take that information and our process is we  
16 put it in our corrective action system and assign it to a  
17 manager to go work with the customer and the employees to  
18 remedy whatever deficiencies there are.

19 This is very typical. We get a number of  
20 comments like this every midterm, and we go work them.  
21 There was nothing out of the ordinary in Mr. Beverly's  
22 comments or concerns that he voiced. They were straight

1 forward and things we normally just go handle.

2 REPORTER: I'm sorry. What was he doing wrong?

3 MR. MILLER: There were schedule performance  
4 problems, not flagging things to management when he would  
5 find a problem, that kind of thing. There was no technical  
6 issue with his QA work or electronical engineering  
7 capability.

8 REPORTER: And a psychological screening question  
9 for both the contractor and the regular NASA employees?

10 MR. COATS: Well, unless an employee is in a  
11 special situation like if he has to have a high security  
12 clearance or for astronauts, if we are going to put them in  
13 long-duration missions or whatever, no, we don't have  
14 psychological screening for the employees.

15 ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: That is not a condition  
16 of employment for Federal civil service, nor for  
17 contractors, unless they are in unusual job situations, and  
18 then they have to agree to have such screening. I mean,  
19 that can't be done on citizens just in an arbitrary way.

20 REPORTER: So Astronaut Nowak might have that --  
21 would have had that screening, you are saying, but not Mr.  
22 Phillips as a contract employee in a non-long-term mission?

1 ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: Broadly speaking, that's  
2 correct.

3 REPORTER: It seems that clearly Mr. Beverly was  
4 Phillips' intended victim. I was just curious. Was Ms.  
5 Crenshaw's office housed in the same location? Was she  
6 supposed to be there?

7 MR. COATS: My understanding is that -- and,  
8 Steve, correct me if I am wrong -- is that Fran and David  
9 did share an office there. So Fran was in that office.  
10 Mr. Phillips was down the hall in a separate office. So he  
11 came down to David Beverly's office, and of course, Fran  
12 was in there because she shared that office.

13 REPORTER: Jennifer Miller with CBS News. My  
14 question was similar.

15 Is there any relationship between Ms. Crenshaw  
16 and Phillips other than she happened to be there when he  
17 came in the room?

18 MR. COATS: No.

19 MODERATOR: And we have got one more over here.

20 REPORTER: Lieutenant, did Crenshaw indicate that  
21 Phillips at any time showed remorse or apologized or  
22 anything during her time being held hostage?

1           LIEUTENANT BAIMBRIDGE: He never showed any  
2 remorse towards killing Mr. Beverly.

3           He did make numerous statements to her that he  
4 wasn't going to hurt her. He did call her his hostage  
5 before he ever shot Mr. Beverly. He made numerous comments  
6 to her that he was his hostage. He did take some care to  
7 not harm her, even when he was duct-taping her hands and  
8 her mouth, but at no time did he ever show any remorse.

9           MODERATOR: And Mark?

10          REPORTER: Thanks. Mark Carreau from the Houston  
11 Chronicle. I think it is for Mike Coats and Mike Griffin.

12          Could you sort of explain how you want to sort of  
13 bring closure as far as a review to this process? I know  
14 sometimes you have review boards, and I know you have a  
15 couple underway after the Nowak incident, but does this  
16 rise to that? What sort of structure will your reviews  
17 take, and who will they report to, and how will you sort of  
18 dispense the findings when they are made in terms of NASA  
19 contractor, human resources, security issues?

20          ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: Mark, I think all of that  
21 remains to be determined.

22          I mean, this happened on a Friday afternoon. We

1 will start on Monday to determine the nature and scope of  
2 any necessary review.

3 I am certainly not a security expert, but we have  
4 people who are, and we will put that process together.

5 Depending on the nature of the conclusions such a  
6 review produces, we will share them in an open fashion with  
7 our contractors and our fellow civil servants and the  
8 press. If there is material that emerges from such a  
9 review that would be viewed as making it more likely that  
10 an incident like this would happen again or that would  
11 reduce our ability to protect such incidents, then just as  
12 the police were informing you earlier, there are things we  
13 don't put out, but we will try to make the best judgment we  
14 can on which is which.

15 MODERATOR: I think we just have two more final  
16 questions here, and then we are going to wrap this up.  
17 Here in the front row.

18 REPORTER: I just wanted to ask a follow-up  
19 question to that. Then not the security, but the actual  
20 psychological profiling, I know you don't do it with the  
21 contractors, but you say that he was -- some people said he  
22 was a disturbed individual beforehand, and they didn't

1 notice any odd behavior other than what they normally saw.

2           With Nowak and with Phillips, is there a way that  
3 maybe you can look at addressing people that might have,  
4 might be disturbed, who people say this person is acting a  
5 little bit funny, have someone go and talk to them? I  
6 imagine this is a very high-stress environment. Would that  
7 be something that is useful to these people that you are  
8 taking steps to look at changing as well?

9           ADMINISTRATOR GRIFFIN: A survey across  
10 Government was just recently completed naming NASA as one  
11 of the top few places in Federal Government service in  
12 which to work. It is hard to accept that we truly have  
13 such a high-stress environment if that is the case.

14           It is a high-performance environment, and our  
15 people are high performers. David Beverly was uniformly  
16 regarded by those who worked with him as an incredibly high  
17 performer in his specialty.

18           We live in a free society. We do not have a  
19 governmental state in which people can be plucked out of  
20 their offices or off the street and made to report for  
21 counseling or evaluation or assessment because someone  
22 thinks they are acting strangely. We do not have such a

1 society.

2           The price for having a free society is that  
3 apparently sometimes incidents such as this occur, but I  
4 can't say enough that we do not live in a society where  
5 because someone else thinks that someone is acting  
6 strangely, that they can be subjected to evaluation,  
7 examination, detention, or any other thing.

8           MODERATOR: This will be our last question.

9           REPORTER: Rasha with AP.

10           Has Mr. Phillips received a negative review  
11 before? Do you have any indication why he reacted badly to  
12 this one?

13           MR. MILLER: Mr. Phillips has been on the  
14 contract since 1992 and a Jacobs employee since 2005. His  
15 last performance evaluation was average, and we give raises  
16 each year. He received an average raise.

17           Up until the last few months, he was considered a  
18 solid-performing employee.

19           MODERATOR: Thank you all very much for your time  
20 and for being here today. That will conclude our press  
21 event.

22           [End of Press Briefing of April 21, 2007.]