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Abort Guidance System
Auxiliary Power Unit
Abort to Orbit
Russian Micropurification Unit (Russian)
Carbon Dioxide Removal System
Colony Forming Unit
Control Moment Gyroscope
Cell Performance Monitor
Compound Specific Analyzer-Combustible Products
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
Electrical Power System
Fuel Cell Monitoring System
Functional Cargo Block (Russian)
Flight Safety Office
Galley Iodine Removal Assembly
Guidance, Navigation, and Control
General Purpose Computer
Global Positioning System
Inertial Measurement Unit
International Space Station
Internal Thermal Control System
Launch Control Officer
Low Iodine Residual System
Loss of Crew
Loss of Vehicle
Minimum Duration Flight
Master Events Controller
Main Landing Gear
Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris
Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA Standard Initiator
Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (NASA HQ)
Protuberance Air Load
Precision Approach Path Indicator
Primary Avionics Software System
Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller
Partial Pressure of CO2
Reaction Control System/Subsystem
Remote Manipulator System
Russia or Russian
Return to Launch Site
Safety & Mission Assurance
Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator
Solid Rocket Booster
Condensate Water Processor Unit (Russian)
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Space Shuttle Program
Thermal Protection System
Loss of Crew
Crew Injury/Illness and/or Loss of Vehicle or Mission
Related or Recurring event
Medical Evacuations (1976-1987)
Salyut 5, 8/25/1976, Crew: 2
Salyut 7, 1985, Crew: 3
Mir EO-2, 1987, Crew: 2
Mir, 10/94, Crew: 6
STS-40, 6/91, Crew: 7*
STS-35, 12/90, Crew: 7*
STS-28, 8/89, Crew: 5*
STS-6, 4/83, Crew: 4*
Salyut 7, 9/82, Crew: 3
Salyut 6, 1979, Crew: 3
Salyut 1, 6/71, Crew: 3
*toxic byproducts released
ISS, 10/10/08, Crew: 3
ISS, 9/18/06, Crew: 3*
ISS, 3/05, Crew: 2
Soyuz 15 8/28/1974
Soyuz 10 4/23/1971
Skylab 2 5/26/1973
Soyuz T-8 4/22/1983
Mercury MA-9 5/16/1963
Gemini 8 3/16-3/17/1966
Soyuz 1 4/23/1967
Soyuz 21 8/24/1976
Soyuz 23 10/16/1976
Soyuz 33 4/12/1979
ISS, Flight 2A.1 5/1999
ISS, Increment 2 4/24/2001
ISS, Increment 4 2/2002
ISS, Increment 2-4 4/2001-3/2002
ISS, Increment 5&6 mid 2002-2/03
ISS, Increment 10 2/2005
ISS, Increment 13 8/2006
ISS, Increment 15 6/10-6/18/2007
ISS, Increment 17 4/30/2008
Soyuz TMA-18 (22S) 9/23/2010
ISS Increment 38 12/1/2013
Salyut 5 | 8/25/1976 | Crew: 2 | Crew Illness
Early return of crew due to health effects from suspected toxic gases in space station.
The Salyut 5 initial crew departed the station early, using Soyuz 21, on August 25, 1976. This was attributed to various causes including fire, environmental system failure, and crew health problems caused by fumes from chemicals used to develop film from the station's surveillance cameras. The subsequent mission crew (Soyuz 24) entered the station wearing protective breathing masks due to the potential contamination.
Salyut 7 | 1985 | Crew: 3 | Crew Illness
One returned with visiting crew due to medical condition.
Because a crew member became ill, the crew of Salyut 7 modified crew operations and ultimately departed the station on November 13, 1985, prior to full mission completion which would have occurred on November 21, 1985.
Mir EO-2 | 7/24/1987 | Crew: 2 | Crew Illness
One crew member replaced early due to medical condition.
On July 24, 1987 during the Mir Principle Expedition 2 (EO-2) one crew member was diagnosed with a heart problem by ground-based doctors and returned to Earth early.
Related or Recurring event
In addition to the three overheating/fire events on the ISS and the two significant events on Mir in 1997 and 1998, other overheating/fire events also occurred on:
Mir (October 1994) (A)
STS-40 (June 1991) (B)
STS-35 (December 1990) (C)
STS-28 (August 1989) (D)
STS-6 (April 1983) (E)
Salyut 7 (September 1982) (F)
Salyut 6 (1979) (G)
Salyut 1 (June 1971) (H)
Information on these events is contained in the reports below.
Related or Recurring event
On February 24, 1997 after replacing the Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator (SFOG) cartridge a fire ignited onboard the Mir space station. After becoming aware of the fire, the crew donned oxygen mask and gathered fire extinguishers. The flames blocked the emergency path to one of the docked Soyuz capsules preventing half of the 6 member crew from evacuating if the need arose. The foam fire extinguishers eventually doused the flames before an evacuation of the station was needed. The proximate cause of the fire is thought to be a piece of latex glove that contaminated the Lithium Perchlorate canister during ground operations.
Related or Recurring event
On February 26, 1998 the Russian Micropurification Unit [BMP] onboard the Russian Mir space station overheated and caused the level of carbon dioxide to climb to health-threatening levels.
Related or Recurring event
On October 10, 2008 the crew reported smoke and odor emitting from the Russian condensate water processor unit [SRV-K]. The equipment housing was hot. When the air quality was tested using the Compound Specific Analyzer-Combustible Products (CSA-CP), carbon dioxide was found at five parts per million and acid gases, hydrogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide, were zero. The [SRV-K] was powered off and replaced, which resolved the issue.
On September 18, 2006 the crew reported smoke and a solvent smell. The Elektron was found to have released toxic byproducts. The CSA-CP registered carbon dioxide at seven parts per million and hydrogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide above one part per million.
In March 2005 an electrical odor was traced to a lamp on the Service Module.
Soyuz 15 | 8/28/1974 | Crew: 2 | Related or Recurring event | Loss of Mission
Failed to dock with Salyut 3 due to Igla system malfunction.
The Soyuz 15 mission launched on August 26, 1974. Its primary mission was to dock to the Saylut 3 military space station to conduct the second phase of crewed operations aboard the Salyut 3 space station. However, docking to the Salyut 3 space station was unsuccessful due to the failure of the Igla rendezvous system and the inability to complete docking in manual mode. Due to this inability to dock, as well as spacecraft battery power limitations, the Soyuz crew was forced to abandon the mission and return to Earth within two days of launch. Gyroscope problems nearly prevented orientation of the spacecraft for the de-orbit burn. After landing, the crew was recovered on August 28, 1974.
The state commission found that the Soyuz Igla docking system needed serious modifications which could not be completed before the Salyut 3 space station decayed beyond a useable orbit. Therefore, the planned Soyuz 16 spacecraft became unnecessary to the program. (It was later flown as Soyuz 20 to a civilian Salyut station, even though it exceeded its two-year rated storage life.)
Soyuz 10 | 4/23/1971 | Crew: 3 | Related or Recurring event | Loss of Mission
Automatic docking system failed. Manual docking with Salyut not achieved.
On April 23, 1971 during automatic approach to Salyut, the Soyuz began to oscillate. The crew went to manual control and was able to complete mechanical capture. During retraction of the probe, the engines began firing because the Soyuz control system was still active. This caused damage to the docking mechanism, which stopped the probe retraction and prevented the Soyuz from completing docking to the Salyut. The crew was instructed to reconfigure cables which allowed them to send a command to release the probe's capture latches. Soyuz was released, and landing occurred on April 25.
Skylab 2 | 5/26/1973 | Crew: 3 | Related or Recurring event
Multiple failed automatic docking attempts resulted in manual docking to Skylab.
On May 26, 1973 numerous failed docking attempts resulted in the use of contingency in-flight procedures to bypass the automated docking system. Successful docking to the Skylab station ultimately relied on manual control and crew piloting skills.
The contingency procedure required the Skylab 2 crew members to don pressure suits, depressurize the command module cabin, open the tunnel hatch, cut wires in the probe, and connect the emergency probe-retract cable using a utility power outlet. The crew members were able to fire the probe-retract pyrotechnic and complete docking manually.
The failure to dock would have resulted in the loss of Skylab due to the inability to perform critical repairs.
Soyuz T-8 | 4/22/1983 | Crew: 3 | Related or Recurring event | Loss of Mission
Loss of rendezvous antenna prevented docking.
On April 20, 1983 the loss of rendezvous antenna prevented docking.
The Soyuz rendezvous radar antenna failed to deploy properly before docking attempts with Salyut 7. Several attitude control maneuvers at high rates were attempted but failed to swing the boom out. A rendezvous using only an optical sight and ground radar inputs for guidance was attempted, but was aborted when it was thought the vehicles were closing too fast. No further attempts were made to dock with the station.
The post-flight inquiry later discovered that the antenna was torn off when the Soyuz payload shroud separated.
STS-130 | 2/10/2010 | Crew: 6 | Related or Recurring event
Experienced significant misalignment between orbiter and ISS during post-capture free drift due to gravity-gradient-induced motion.
On February 10, 2010 there were significant oscillations between the orbiter and ISS on STS-130 during final ring retraction, requiring an additional 34 minutes in free drift to complete docking. Similar oscillations were observed during STS-133 docking.
Post-flight analysis from the STS-130 event indicated that the oscillations were caused by gravity gradient effects on the integrated vehicle stack (ISS/Shuttle) resulting in misalignment of the final docking ring and loss of the “RING ALIGN” indication. When the “RING ALIGN” indication is lost, the fixers are released, resulting in large misalignments.
Concern for ISS longeron shadowing and lack of data resulted in the Missions Operations Directorate not accepting the recommendation to rely on the fixers to maintain the alignment even after loss of “RING ALIGN” until after STS-133.
STS-133 | 2/26/2011 | Crew: 6 | Related or Recurring event
Experienced significant misalignment between orbiter and ISS during post-capture free drift due to gravity-gradient-induced motion.
On February 26, 2011 STS-133 experienced significant misalignment between the orbiter and the ISS during post-capture free drift due to gravity-gradient-induced motion.
There were significant oscillations between the orbiter and ISS on STS-133 during final ring retraction. The orbiter tipped approximately 10 degrees in pitch and four degrees in roll while ring retraction was paused. The time from contact to hardmate took 50 minutes.
Post-flight analysis of STS-133 docking operations raised several concerns, including vehicle-to-vehicle clearance, mechanism-to-mechanism contact, ISS free drift risks (longeron shadowing risk), timeline impacts, and the lack of a good integrated analysis tool.
At the Generic Joint Operations Panel on April, 6 2011 it was stated that the docking mechanism fixers will be used to maintain alignment during retraction. Engineering and safety agreed with the recommendation. The docking procedures were updated prior to STS-134/ULF6.
Mir | 8/30/1994 | Crew: Soyuz 2, Mir 3 | Related or Recurring event
Soyuz TM-17 collided twice with Mir during undocking.
On January 14, 1994 during the post-separation inspection fly-around of Mir, the crew lost manual translation control due to a configuration error. The loss of control led to the Soyuz colliding with Mir several times. The cause of the collision was traced to the hand controller in the orbital module which governed braking and acceleration being switched on, disabling the equivalent hand controller in the descent module.
Mir | 8/30/1994 | Mir Crew: 2 | Related or Recurring event
Progress M-24 collided with Mir during second docking attempt.
On August 30, 1994 during the second attempt of the Progress M-24 to dock with Mir, the Progress collided with Mir's forward docking unit two to four times, and then drifted away from the station. The docking problems with Progress M-24 have been variously attributed to software or Kurs electronics failures on Progress M-24, or the failure of control equipment in the Moscow Mission Control Center.
Mir | 6/25/1997 | Mir Crew: 3 | Loss of Mission | Related or Recurring event
Progress M-34 collided with Mir. Spektr pressure shell ruptured. Spektr module isolated. Cables through hatchway impeded hatch closing.
Mir Crew: 3
Loss of Element
On June 25, 1997 Progress M-34 collided with the Mir Spektr module rupturing the module. The crew of Mir had to cut through cables in the hatchway in order to seal off the leaking module from the rest of the station.
Mercury MA-9 | 5/16/1963 | Crew: 1 | Manual Entry
Electrical faults caused loss of some systems and need to perform manual entry. Also experienced high PPCO2 levels in suit during entry operations.
During the May 16, 1963 flight electrical faults caused the loss of some systems and the need to perform manual entry. The alternating current power supply for the control system failed to operate, and it was determined that the pilot would have to make a manual retrofire and re-entry. He performed these maneuvers with close precision and landed a short distance from the prime recovery ship in the Pacific Ocean.
The malfunction during re-entry on MA-9 was traced to two connectors in an electrical amplifier.
Gemini 8 | 3/16-3/17/1966 | Crew: 2 | Emergency De-orbit | Loss of Mission
Stuck thruster caused loss of control and led to 1st U.S. emergency
During the Gemini 8 flight from March 16 – 17, 1966 a stuck thruster, number 8, which controls roll, caused a loss of control and rapid spin rate of the capsule that could have led to the crew losing consciousness. To counter the effects the stuck thruster was turned off and the re-entry control system had to be used to stabilize the capsule. Use of the re-entry control system led the Gemini safety group to declare an end to the mission, which led to the first United States emergency de-orbit. The thruster apparently short circuited while attached to the Agena target vehicle.
Soyuz 1 | 4/23/1967 | Crew: 1 | Loss of Mission
Failures in attitude control and electrical power systems resulted in a loss of mission. The launch of the intended docking target, Soyuz 2, was scrubbed.
After achieving orbital insertion on April 23, 1967 the left solar array of the Soyuz 1 spacecraft did not deploy, causing the spacecraft to receive only half of the planned solar power. Despite the solar array failure, the crew member attempted to maneuver the spacecraft. The attempt was unsuccessful because of interference between the reaction control system exhaust and the ion flow sensors.
The failure of the solar array to deploy also prevented the cover of the sun and star sensor from opening, preventing attitude control for crucial maneuvers such as spin stabilization and engine firings. The failures on Soyuz 1 prevented the launch of Soyuz 2, which had been scheduled to rendezvous and dock with Soyuz 1, causing the Soyuz 1 mission to be ended early.
Due to the failures with the control systems, the cosmonaut had to manually control the spacecraft for the critical de-orbit burn and entry while also managing the power supply of the crippled vehicle. (See also Soyuz 1 entry event)
Soyuz 21 | 8/24/1976 | Crew: 2
Separation from Salyut failed; ground command succeeded in opening latches.
On August 24, 1976 separation from Salyut failed. Prior to the latches being fully open, the latches gave a false ‘open' indication, leading to the premature firing of the Soyuz separation thrusters and jamming the latches partially open. The Soyuz remained loosely attached to the station until ground control was able to send commands to the latches, forcing them open.
Soyuz 23 | 10/16/1976 | Crew: 2 | Loss of Mission
Mission Abort due to docking failure.
The Soyuz 23 mission launched on October 14, 1976. Its primary mission was to dock to the Saylut 5 space station to conduct crewed operations aboard the station. However, docking to the Salyut 5 space station was unsuccessful due to the failure of the automated rendezvous system. Sensors used by the automatic system indicated an incorrect lateral velocity, causing unnecessary firing of the thrusters during rendezvous. The automatic system was turned off, but no fuel reserves remained for a manual docking attempt with the Salyut 5. The mission was aborted, and low spacecraft battery reserves forced the crew to return early. Upon re-entry/landing the capsule landed in a lake during a snow storm, delaying crew recovery (see Soyuz 23 landing event). The crew was recovered on October 16, 1976.
Soyuz 33 | 4/12/1979 | Crew: 2 | Loss of Mission
Main engine anomaly caused final rendezvous abort.
On April 12, 1979 during docking attempts the crew aboard Salyut 6 reported flames shooting sideways from the main engine, toward the backup engine, at the time of the shutdown. The docking was canceled and the Soyuz crew prepared to return to Earth. (See Soyuz 33 entry event)
STS-2 | 11/21/1981 | Crew: 2 | Minimum Duration Flight | Crew Injury
Failure of fuel cell resulted in a MDF being declared. The fuel cell failure also resulted in hydrogen in the drinking water leading to crew dehydration.
During the flight of STS-2, which spanned from November 12 – 14, 1981, fuel cell failure led to the declaration of a minimum duration flight (MDF). In addition to the MDF, the failure of the fuel cell also led to high hydrogen levels in the drinking water. The fuel cells used produce drinking water as a by product. When the crew drank this water it provoked a need to belch. Belching in zero g leads to regurgitation. The crew avoiding drinking the water in order to avoid belching, which caused crew dehydration. Prior to entry, crew members fluid load to offset fluid shift when returning from orbit. The crew dehydration increased the effects of the fluid shift and could have posed a risk during high g entry procedures due to a higher chance for loss of consciousness.
STS-9 | 12/8/1983 | Crew: 3
Two GPCs failed during reconfiguration for entry. One GPC could not be recovered.
On December 8, 1983 about five hours prior to the planned landing time, the orbiter's General Purpose Computer (GPC) 1 failed when the primary Reaction Control System jets were fired. About six minutes later GPC 2 also failed, leaving the orbiter in free drift for approximately five minutes before GPC 3 was brought online in OPS 3 entry mode (GPC 3 had been freeze dried for on-orbit operations). Attempts to bring GPC 1 back online were unsuccessful, and it was powered down.
Although problems had occurred, GPC 2 was reinitialized and placed back online, and GPCs 2, 3, 4, and 5 were configured for entry. This off-nominal configuration led to further problems, and delayed the landing time by about eight hours. Entry was set up without GPC 1, and upon landing GPC 2 failed again. Particle Impact Noise Detection testing was instituted to screen out any contamination of the GPC boards, and a spare GPC was flown for several flights after STS-9, but was later dropped as a requirement.
STS-32 | 1/9/1990 | Crew: 3 | Loss of Attitude Control
Erroneous state vector up-linked to flight control system, causing immediate and unpredictable attitude control problems.
An erroneous state vector up-linked to the flight control system on January 9, 1990 causing immediate and unpredictable attitude control problems.
At 17:23:46:51 Greenwich Mean Time, during a crew sleep period, a state vector update was commanded by the ground prior to the loss of signal. The uploaded state vector was erroneous, and the orbiter began to execute a multi-axis rotation at three degrees per second with a number of thruster firings. The rotation continued until the acquisition of signal period, about 10 minutes later, when the crew was awakened and instructed to switch to manual Digital Auto Pilot to arrest the unwanted rates. A good state vector was then uplinked.
STS-44 | 11/24/1991 | Crew: 6 | Minimum Duration Flight
Failure of IMU 2 caused MDF to be declared. 10-day mission shortened to 7 days.
Failure of Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) number 2 on November 24, 1991 caused minimum duration flight to be declared. The 10-day mission was shortened to seven days. In an attempt to recover normal operation of the IMU, it was placed in standby, operate, and then power cycled. These actions were not successful. Failure of this IMU invoked a flight rule requiring minimum duration flight for loss of one IMU.
Post-flight troubleshooting in the Inertial Systems Laboratory at Johnson Space Center isolated the problem to a failed computer interface card. This card converts analog acceleration signals into digital signals. The failed card was sent to the manufacturer for further analysis which revealed that a filter capacitor (C14), located within a chopper-stabilized amplifier hybrid component (U12) in the Z-accelerator channel, had shorted. This short circuit caused a bond wire from U12 pin 9 to the card case to fuse open.
STS-51 | 9/12/1993 | Crew: 5 |
Both port-side primary and secondary SUPER*ZIP explosive cords fired, resulting in containment tube failure and damage in the payload bay.
On September 12, 1993 the STS-51 mission commands intended to initiate the primary SUPER*ZIP explosive cord resulted in the simultaneous firing of both the primary explosive cord and back-up explosive cord. This simultaneous explosive cord firing resulted in the rupture of a SUPER*ZIP containment tube and release of contaminants and high-energy debris into the orbiter cargo bay. The orbiter sustained damage to blankets, wire tray covers, the 1307 bulkhead, and Thermal Protection System tiles. If debris had hit critical items it could have resulted in a loss of the orbiter and crew.
STS-83 | 4/6/1997 | Crew: 7 | Loss of Mission
Failure of fuel cell number 2 resulted in MDF being declared. The 15-day mission was shortened to 3 days.
A failure of fuel cell (FC) number two resulted in a minimum duration flight being declared on April 6,1997. The 16-day mission was reduced to four days due to FC problems encountered on flight day two. During prelaunch operations the differential voltage on FC 2, substack 3 remained above the 150mV limit (defined in the Operations and Maintenance Requirements Specification Document) for an unusually long period of time before dropping below 150 mV. The substack delta voltage began to trend upward shortly after on-orbit operations began at approximately two hours Mission Elapsed Time. FC purges were ineffective at stopping the trend. FC 2 was subsequently shut down and safed to prevent the possibility of a crossover condition, and multiple payloads had to be powered down. FCs 1 and 3 continued to carry the total orbiter load and performed nominally.
Post-flight failure analysis of FC 2 did not identify a root cause for the on-orbit anomaly experienced, but did identify degraded cells and verified the cell performance monitor (CPM) was functioning properly. No foreign material/contaminant was found and the most credible scenario implies an abnormal external event affected a group of cells prior to start–up. It has been hypothesized that this external event was the presence of oxygen in the oxygen side of substack 3 of the FC at a time when the FC was supposed to be inerted with helium. This event over time would cause oxidation of the nickel Electrolyte Reservoir Plate and dissolution of palladium and platinum in the anodes. Migration and plating of the palladium onto the cathode catalyst would cause high open circuit voltage once full reactants are applied to the FC.
As a result of this anomaly and failure analysis, the Launch Commit Criteria was revised to not allow launching with an FC showing similar prelaunch CPM readings. Kennedy Space Center FC purge procedures were also modified to preclude the potential for the presence of oxygen in inerted fuel cells. The program also designed and tested a fuel-cell monitoring system (FCMS) which finally provided individual cell-health monitoring capability (STS-87 first flight). If the FCMS had been available for STS-83, it may have precluded the shutdown of the FC and may have allowed the mission to complete its planned duration.
Mir | 7/17/1997 | Crew: 3
Accidental unplugging of computer power cable led to loss of attitude control and loss of power.
On July 16, 1997 a cosmonaut inadvertently unplugged a central computer power cable while disconnecting cables for upcoming repairs of the Spektr module. The temporary loss of power caused the central computer to shut down, resulting in the loss of attitude control and Mir going into free drift. In free drift the Mir was unable to accurately point its solar arrays to provide sufficient power. Once in free drift, the ground and flight crew failed to turn off equipment to reduce power demand, which resulted in depletion of stored energy in the flight batteries and complete loss of power on Mir.
The Progress M-35 supply spacecraft was used to reorient the Mir to restore nominal solar array power generation, recharge flight batteries, and subsequently restore Mir attitude control functions.
STS-87 | 11/27/1997 | Crew: 6
Spartan satellite deployed without proper activation.
Recapture with RMS unsuccessful. Later captured by EVA crew.
Deployment of the SPARTAN satellite on November 21, 1997 occurred without proper activation.
A crew input via the Payload and General Support Computer was not received by the spacecraft. Lack of telemetry and onboard verification procedures left this condition undetected by the Mission Control Center and flight crew. The SPARTAN was grappled with the Remote Manipulator System, removed from the Release/Engage Mechanism, and released per the flight plan.
The missed command step resulted in the failure of the SPARTAN to execute an expected preprogrammed maneuver ("pirouette") about 2.5 minutes after deploy. Attempts to re-grapple the SPARTAN after the deployment were unsuccessful. A previously scheduled extravehicular activity (space walk) had to be changed to manually recapture the satellite.
STS-95 | 10/29/1998 | Crew: 7
Preflight sterilization process chemically altered the Low Iodine Residual System resulting in contaminated drinking water.
During STS-95 on October 29, 1998 the preflight sterilization process chemically altered the Low Iodine Residual System (LIRS) resulting in contaminated drinking water.
The crew reported the water from the galley with the LIRS installed had a bad taste. Samples of the water were taken post-flight for analysis. The LIRS was removed. A purge of the LIRS water from the galley plumbing was conducted. After the purge the Galley Iodine Removal Assembly was reinstalled and the crew reported that the water taste was normal after the change-out of hardware.
The bad tasting water could have led to possible crew dehydration due to the crew drinking less water.
ISS, Flight 2A.1 | 5/1999 | Crew: 7
Crew sickened in FGB; likely a result of high localized CO2 levels due to poor ventilation.
During ISS Flight 2A.1 in May 1999, the crew was sickened in the Functional Cargo Block [FGB], likely as result of high localized carbon dioxide levels due to poor ventilation. The evidence suggests that human metabolic products (carbon dioxide, water vapor, heat) were not being effectively removed from the crew member work area, and therefore caused the symptoms.
The number of crew members working in the [FGB] may also have contributed to the air quality issues.
Additionally, the flexible air duct running between the orbiter's Pressurized Mating Adapter 1 and the [FGB] may have contributed to poor air quality. The flexible air duct has a tendency to collapse with only minor incidental contact.
This duct was later redesigned to minimize the potential for collapse and restricted air flow.
STS-99 | 2/2000 | Crew: 6
High bacterial count in postflight sample after GIRA installed to removed iodine.
During the February 2000 flight, a high bacterial count of 160 colony forming units (CFUs)per 100 ml was discovered in a post-flight sample after the Galley Iodine Removal Assembly was installed to remove iodine. The level should have been less than 100 CFUs/100 ml.
ISS, Increment 2 | 4/24/2001 | Crew: 10
Failure of all U.S. command and control computers on ISS.
On April 24, 2001 the ISS Command and Control (C&C) Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM)-1 suffered hard drive errors that resulted in C&C-1 going offline.C&C-2 automatically switched from backup to primary mode, but suffered hard drive errors. C&C-3 was brought online but also failed. This resulted in complete loss of command and control to the United States orbital segment. C&C-2 was restored and placed into operation in primary mode. Flight controllers were able to uplink critical C&C software into the dynamic random access memory of C&C-3. C&C-3 was declared operational except the hard drive. C&C-1 was replaced with an identical payload computer.
If the MDMs were unrecoverable, the failure could have resulted in the loss of the United States orbital segment.
STS-104 | 7/2001 | Crew: 5
EMU battery leaked hazardous KOH. Discovered during EMU checkout.
During the first pre-extravehicular activity checkout of the July 2001 flight, an increased capacity extravehicular mobility unit (space suit) battery was discovered to have leaked hazardous potassium hydroxide. The leakage resulted in potassium hydroxide deposits on the contamination control cartridge, the water tank structure, and other locations on the primary life support system of the space suit.
ISS | 8/2001 | Crew: 3
Extremely high methanol levels in FGB air sample.
During August 2001 Functional Cargo Block [FGB] air samples contained extremely high methanol levels. The source of the methanol was never identified.
ISS, Increment 4 | 2/2002 | Crew: 3
MetOx regeneration caused noxious air.
During ISS Increment 4, February 2002, the United States Orbital Segment metal oxide canister regeneration caused the release of pollutants into the air.
ISS, Increment 2-4 | 4/2001-3/2002 | Crew: 3
Freon 218 leaked from SM AC.
During ISS Increments 2-4, which spanned from April 2001 until March 2002, Freon 218 leaked from the Service Module air conditioner.
Freon 218, a coolant fluid used in the air conditioning system, was found in cabin air quality samples after Zvezda was activated. The concentration of the Freon increased slowly once detected, but then rapidly as time passed. Peak concentrations reached over 600 mg/m3.
ISS, Increment 5&6 | mid 2002-2/03 | Crew: 3-10
Formaldehyde periodically exceeded long-term limits.
During ISS Increments 5 and 6, which spanned from mid-2002 until February 2003, formaldehyde levels onboard the station periodically exceeded the long-term limits.
ISS, Increment 10 | 2/2005 | Crew: 2
Potential acid preservative aerosol escape from Russian urinal.
In February 2005 during ISS Increment 10 an acid preservative aerosol escaped from the Russian urinal.
ISS, Increment 13 | 8/2006 | Crew: 3
Triol coolant leak in SM.
In August 2006 during ISS Increment 13, about 150 grams of Triol coolant leaked from the Docking Compartment-1 Hydraulic Cooling Loop Connector in the Service Module. The crew cleaned and monitored the area throughout the day. No additional leaking was reported.
ISS, Increment 15 | 6/10-6/18/2007 | Crew: 10
Power switch failures caused loss of ISS propulsive attitude control capability.
On June 10-18 2007 Russian computers that provide ISS propulsive attitude control [ТВМ], and Russian segment command and control capability [ЦВМ], experienced multiple automatic and manual restarts. ISS attitude control was maintained by the docked shuttle (Atlantis STS-117/13A) while Russian specialists and US teams worked to restore consistent power to the computers. The Russian cosmonauts were able to re-establish two of three computers on both systems ([ТВМ], [ЦВМ]) by June 18 after bypassing the secondary power circuitry to provide a continuous “ON” command.
Troubleshooting later identified the root cause to be an electrical short in the line resulting from corrosion of cabling within the Command Acquisition (Processing) Unit [БОК3] which monitors power. The short caused a power-off command to be passed to all six computers. The corrosion was presumed to be caused by increased humidity resulting from the close proximity of an air separator to the [БОК3]. The [БОК3] was subsequently relocated to a separate compartment.
If the Russian computers were unrecoverable, the failure could have resulted in the loss of ISS attitude control and loss of ISS.
ISS, Increment 17 | 4/30/2008 | Crew: 3
Freon 218 leaked from SM AC.
On April 30, 2008 Freon 218 leaked from the Service Module air conditioner. The Russian [BMP] (Russian Microimpurities Removal System) was modified to allow for faster removal of the Freon 218.
Soyuz TMA-18 (22S) | 9/23/2010 | Crew: Soyuz 3, ISS 3
First attempt to separate from ISS failed; ISS crew succeeded in bypassing faulty sensor.
The first attempt to separate the Soyuz from ISS on September 23, 2010 failed. A hatch sensor on the Poisk docking port of the Zvezda module prevented hooks on the Poisk side from opening.
ISS Increment 38 | 12/1/2013 | Crew: 6
ITCS configuration errors resulted in near freezing and potential rupture of water-to-ammonia heat exchanger.
On December 11, 2013 the failure of a flow control valve in the pump module of the External Thermal Control System (ETCS) and subsequent Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) reconfiguration led to a drop in water temperature to nearly freezing in the Columbus module's Moderate Temperature Heat Exchanger (MTHX). If the water in the Interface Heat Exchanger (IFHX) had frozen, the expansion could have ruptured the barrier between the ITCS and the ETCS. A rupture of this barrier could allow ammonia to enter the interior crew portions of the ISS, causing a potential loss of crew/loss of vehicle.
Mir Collision Events (1994-1997)
LANDING & POSTLANDING