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INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
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Abort Guidance System
Auxiliary Power Unit
Abort to Orbit
Russian Micropurification Unit (Russian)
Carbon Dioxide Removal System
Colony Forming Unit
Control Moment Gyroscope
Cell Performance Monitor
Compound Specific Analyzer-Combustible Products
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
Electrical Power System
Fuel Cell Monitoring System
Functional Cargo Block (Russian)
Flight Safety Office
Galley Iodine Removal Assembly
Guidance, Navigation, and Control
General Purpose Computer
Global Positioning System
Inertial Measurement Unit
International Space Station
Internal Thermal Control System
Launch Control Officer
Low Iodine Residual System
Loss of Crew
Loss of Vehicle
Minimum Duration Flight
Master Events Controller
Main Landing Gear
Micro-Meteoroid Orbital Debris
Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA Standard Initiator
Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (NASA HQ)
Protuberance Air Load
Precision Approach Path Indicator
Primary Avionics Software System
Pyrotechnic Initiator Controller
Partial Pressure of CO2
Reaction Control System/Subsystem
Remote Manipulator System
Russia or Russian
Return to Launch Site
Safety & Mission Assurance
Solid Fuel Oxygen Generator
Solid Rocket Booster
Condensate Water Processor Unit (Russian)
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Space Shuttle Program
Thermal Protection System
Loss of Crew
Crew Injury/Illness and/or Loss of Vehicle or Mission
Related or Recurring event
ISS, 10/10/08, Crew: 3
ISS, 9/18/06, Crew: 3*
ISS, 3/05, Crew: 2
ISS, Flight 2A.1 5/1999
ISS, Increment 2 4/24/2001
ISS, Increment 4 2/2002
ISS, Increment 2-4 4/2001-3/2002
ISS, Increment 5&6 mid 2002-2/03
ISS, Increment 10 2/2005
ISS, Increment 13 8/2006
ISS, Increment 15 6/10-6/18/2007
ISS, Increment 17 4/30/2008
Soyuz TMA-18 (22S) 9/23/2010
ISS Increment 38 12/1/2013
Related or Recurring event
On October 10, 2008 the crew reported smoke and odor emitting from the Russian condensate water processor unit [SRV-K]. The equipment housing was hot. When the air quality was tested using the Compound Specific Analyzer-Combustible Products (CSA-CP), carbon dioxide was found at five parts per million and acid gases, hydrogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide, were zero. The [SRV-K] was powered off and replaced, which resolved the issue.
On September 18, 2006 the crew reported smoke and a solvent smell. The Elektron was found to have released toxic byproducts. The CSA-CP registered carbon dioxide at seven parts per million and hydrogen chloride and hydrogen cyanide above one part per million.
In March 2005 an electrical odor was traced to a lamp on the Service Module.
ISS, Flight 2A.1 | 5/1999 | Crew: 7
Crew sickened in FGB; likely a result of high localized CO2 levels due to poor ventilation.
During ISS Flight 2A.1 in May 1999, the crew was sickened in the Functional Cargo Block [FGB], likely as result of high localized carbon dioxide levels due to poor ventilation. The evidence suggests that human metabolic products (carbon dioxide, water vapor, heat) were not being effectively removed from the crew member work area, and therefore caused the symptoms.
The number of crew members working in the [FGB] may also have contributed to the air quality issues.
Additionally, the flexible air duct running between the orbiter's Pressurized Mating Adapter 1 and the [FGB] may have contributed to poor air quality. The flexible air duct has a tendency to collapse with only minor incidental contact.
This duct was later redesigned to minimize the potential for collapse and restricted air flow.
ISS, Increment 2 | 4/24/2001 | Crew: 10
Failure of all U.S. command and control computers on ISS.
On April 24, 2001 the ISS Command and Control (C&C) Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM)-1 suffered hard drive errors that resulted in C&C-1 going offline.C&C-2 automatically switched from backup to primary mode, but suffered hard drive errors. C&C-3 was brought online but also failed. This resulted in complete loss of command and control to the United States orbital segment. C&C-2 was restored and placed into operation in primary mode. Flight controllers were able to uplink critical C&C software into the dynamic random access memory of C&C-3. C&C-3 was declared operational except the hard drive. C&C-1 was replaced with an identical payload computer.
If the MDMs were unrecoverable, the failure could have resulted in the loss of the United States orbital segment.
ISS | 8/2001 | Crew: 3
Extremely high methanol levels in FGB air sample.
During August 2001 Functional Cargo Block [FGB] air samples contained extremely high methanol levels. The source of the methanol was never identified.
ISS, Increment 4 | 2/2002 | Crew: 3
MetOx regeneration caused noxious air.
During ISS Increment 4, February 2002, the United States Orbital Segment metal oxide canister regeneration caused the release of pollutants into the air.
ISS, Increment 2-4 | 4/2001-3/2002 | Crew: 3
Freon 218 leaked from SM AC.
During ISS Increments 2-4, which spanned from April 2001 until March 2002, Freon 218 leaked from the Service Module air conditioner.
Freon 218, a coolant fluid used in the air conditioning system, was found in cabin air quality samples after Zvezda was activated. The concentration of the Freon increased slowly once detected, but then rapidly as time passed. Peak concentrations reached over 600 mg/m3.
ISS, Increment 5&6 | mid 2002-2/03 | Crew: 3-10
Formaldehyde periodically exceeded long-term limits.
During ISS Increments 5 and 6, which spanned from mid-2002 until February 2003, formaldehyde levels onboard the station periodically exceeded the long-term limits.
ISS, Increment 10 | 2/2005 | Crew: 2
Potential acid preservative aerosol escape from Russian urinal.
In February 2005 during ISS Increment 10 an acid preservative aerosol escaped from the Russian urinal.
ISS, Increment 13 | 8/2006 | Crew: 3
Triol coolant leak in SM.
In August 2006 during ISS Increment 13, about 150 grams of Triol coolant leaked from the Docking Compartment-1 Hydraulic Cooling Loop Connector in the Service Module. The crew cleaned and monitored the area throughout the day. No additional leaking was reported.
ISS, Increment 15 | 6/10-6/18/2007 | Crew: 10
Power switch failures caused loss of ISS propulsive attitude control capability.
On June 10-18 2007 Russian computers that provide ISS propulsive attitude control [ТВМ], and Russian segment command and control capability [ЦВМ], experienced multiple automatic and manual restarts. ISS attitude control was maintained by the docked shuttle (Atlantis STS-117/13A) while Russian specialists and US teams worked to restore consistent power to the computers. The Russian cosmonauts were able to re-establish two of three computers on both systems ([ТВМ], [ЦВМ]) by June 18 after bypassing the secondary power circuitry to provide a continuous “ON” command.
Troubleshooting later identified the root cause to be an electrical short in the line resulting from corrosion of cabling within the Command Acquisition (Processing) Unit [БОК3] which monitors power. The short caused a power-off command to be passed to all six computers. The corrosion was presumed to be caused by increased humidity resulting from the close proximity of an air separator to the [БОК3]. The [БОК3] was subsequently relocated to a separate compartment.
If the Russian computers were unrecoverable, the failure could have resulted in the loss of ISS attitude control and loss of ISS.
ISS, Increment 17 | 4/30/2008 | Crew: 3
Freon 218 leaked from SM AC.
On April 30, 2008 Freon 218 leaked from the Service Module air conditioner. The Russian [BMP] (Russian Microimpurities Removal System) was modified to allow for faster removal of the Freon 218.
Soyuz TMA-18 (22S) | 9/23/2010 | Crew: Soyuz 3, ISS 3
First attempt to separate from ISS failed; ISS crew succeeded in bypassing faulty sensor.
The first attempt to separate the Soyuz from ISS on September 23, 2010 failed. A hatch sensor on the Poisk docking port of the Zvezda module prevented hooks on the Poisk side from opening.
ISS Increment 38 | 12/1/2013 | Crew: 6
ITCS configuration errors resulted in near freezing and potential rupture of water-to-ammonia heat exchanger.
On December 11, 2013 the failure of a flow control valve in the pump module of the External Thermal Control System (ETCS) and subsequent Internal Thermal Control System (ITCS) reconfiguration led to a drop in water temperature to nearly freezing in the Columbus module's Moderate Temperature Heat Exchanger (MTHX). If the water in the Interface Heat Exchanger (IFHX) had frozen, the expansion could have ruptured the barrier between the ITCS and the ETCS. A rupture of this barrier could allow ammonia to enter the interior crew portions of the ISS, causing a potential loss of crew/loss of vehicle.
LANDING & POSTLANDING